CLE: 2009: Fourth Amendment Analysis: Understanding the Probable Cause and Warrant Requirements of the Fourth Amendment

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Title

CLE: 2009: Fourth Amendment Analysis: Understanding the Probable Cause and Warrant Requirements of the Fourth Amendment

Creator

Gerald S. Reamey

Publisher

St. Mary's University School of Law San Antonio Texas Alumni Homecoming, St. Mary's University School of Law Alumni Homecoming

Date

2009-03-27

Relation

St. Mary's University School of Law Alumni Homecoming

Format

RFC3778

Language

English, en-US

Type

Text

Identifier

STMU_HomecomingCLE2009Reamey

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Text

© Gerald S. Reamey (2008)
Acknowledgment: I am grateful for the research assistance of Mr. Andrew
Skemp of St. Mary's University School of Law in compiling citations and
authorities for the notes accompanying these slides.

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State Action: Only those persons acting under color of state or federal law can violate the 4 1h Amendment. See
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). Note that in Texas, private party searches and seizures might lead to
exclusion of evidence, contrary to the 4th Amendment requirement. See Mifes v. State, 241 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007). "State actors" usually are law enforcement officers, but other agents of the government may qualify.
See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O. , 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (assistant high school principal considered "state actor.")

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Standing: The requirement that a defendant have "standing" to raise a 41h Amendment claim has to some extent
been conflated with the threshold question of whether there was a "search." Both are determined by whether the
person raising the claim had a reasonable (sometimes "legitimate") expectation of privacy in the place searched or
the thing seized. In other words, did the claimant have a personal privacy right that was infringed by the
government's conduct? This question has played out in several contexts, including vehicles in which a passenger
wished to invoke the exclusionary rule, see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), and a residence in which a guestnot the owner or principal occupant- claimed a 4th Amendment violation. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83
(1998). Remember that a person's right to be free from unreasonable search is distinct from that same person's right
to be free from an unreasonable seizure. So, e.g., a vehicle passenger may be seized unlawfully when the driver is
stopped without sufficient suspicion, but that same passenger would have no standing to complain about even a
patently unlawful search of the vehicle's interior that uncovered contraband to be offered in evidence against the
passenger. See Rakas, supra. At the same time, the vehicle passenger does have a REOP in the pockets of his
clothing, his or her briefcase, purse, or backpack, or in other areas over which he or she shares control with the
driver.
"Search"? "Seizure"?: By its terms, the 41h Amendment applies only to "searches" and "seizures." The definitions
of these terms are quite different. A "search" involves invasion into a place in which the person has a REOP. See
Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 {1967). A "seizure" of the person- whether by arrest or temporary investigative detention
(a Teny stop) -requires either (1) submission to a show of authority by the state actor, or (2) being physically
restrained by that actor. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991 ). Merely pursuing a flee1ng suspect does
not, by itself, constitute a "seizure." /d. A "search" may involve such things as eavesdropping, see Katz, supra,
squeezing a passenger's luggage to determine its contents, see Bond v. U.S., 529 U.S. 334 (2000), or using a
thermal imager to discover whether a heat source (like lamps used to grow marijuana) is being used in a home. See
Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27 (2001 ). Tracking a vehicle on a public road by use of an electronic device isn't a search
because one's movements in public carry no REOP, see U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), but using an electronic
tracking device that reveals movements 1nside a home is a search because the device discloses information about an
area in which the suspect has a REOP, see U.S. v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).

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In recent years, the 4th Amendment has been conceptualized , not as a rule
requiring "probable cause and a warrant" , but as a guarantee that the
government's interference with liberty and privacy interests be "reasonable ."
This shift in emphasis has not resulted in the abandonment of "probable
cause" or "warrants" as desirable and important prerequisites for lawful
searches and seizures. Both of these "requirements" (which are no longer
strictly required) are seen as the "gold standard" for judging reasonableness.
They just are not the exclusive way in which reasonableness can be
established.

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Probable Cause-Defined

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Both "definitions" are repeated , with minor variations in many opinions. See,
e.g., Brinegarv. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949). Despite the courts'
frequent recitation of these "standards," the definitions offer only the most
general guidance. It is worth noting that probable cause for arrest strongly
suggests suspicion that a particular person has committed, or is committing an
offense. This standard , unlike reasonable suspicion, does not reach
anticipated offenses (i.e., crimes that are "about to be committed"). For its
part, the probable cause to search requires reasonable belief that the soughtafter evidence will be found in a particular place.

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This "sliding scale" illustrates the continuum of suspicion by which courts and
law enforcement officers determine the justification for interference with liberty
and privacy. More intrusive invasions of these rights are justified by greater
levels of suspicion. Less intrusive invasions (e.g., a "detention" or "frisk")
require less suspicion (e.g., "reasonable suspicion") than greater invasions
(e.g. , "arrest"), which usually require probable cause, the only level of
suspicion explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. It is unclear from the
opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States exactly where "probable
cause" and "reasonable suspicion" fall on this continuum , at least in terms of
probability. Is probable cause like preponderance of the evidence? Something
more? Less? Cases can be found supporting varying positioning on the
continuum, but terms like "fair probability" - unhelpful though they may be are used to describe its placement. Similarly, "reasonable suspicion" cannot
be located precisely, although it is an "objective" assessment, based on
"articulable" facts known to "prudent" officers, considering their "experience"
and training. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 397 U.S. 1 (1969). It is clear enough
that no "search" or "seizure" may occur with less than reasonable suspicion,
although some "non-searches" can render incriminating evidence, and it is
clear that probable cause is not the same as certainty. In fact, it is
considerably less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt which , in turn, is itself
less than certainty.

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Detention/frisk: This is "arrest-lite" and "search-lite ." Both require a level of suspicion (reasonable suspicion}
less than the probable cause necessary for more intrusive versions of search and seizure. See Terry v. Ohio,
397 U.S. 1 (1969).
Consent: Consent is essentially a waiver of privacy or liberty rights. It is not, however, technically seen by the
Court as a "waiver" requiring the kind of warnings that must precede a waiver of 5th Amendment rights. See
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). The principal issue with consent is voluntariness, whether the
consent was given free of coercion. Mere acquiescence to authority is not voluntary consent See Bumper v.
North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Kolb v. State, 532 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. Grim. App. 1976). Consent, once
given, may be withdrawn at any time and extends only to those areas expressly or implicitly within the objective
understanding of the permission.
Border searches: The principle of sovereignty essentially trumps the 41h Amendment at an international border
or its functional equivalent (think airport). What may be unreasonable in any other setting may, on balance, be
considered reasonable when governmental interests in protecting the secunty of the border are added to the
usual need for law enforcement. See U.S. v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
Abandonment: When property is abandoned, which must be done voluntarily and w ith intent to abandon (see
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988)), one ceases to have a REOP in that property. Consequently, the
4th Amendment no longer applies or, one could say, the former owner/possessor no longer has "standing" to
complain of the way in which it is seized. See Greenwood, supra. The voluntariness of abandonment, however,
may be undermined by government conduct that effectively forces a person to dispossess himself/herself of the
item. See Salcido v. State, 758 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Grim. App. 1988}.
Plain view, touch, smell: Anything that is exposed to public view or observation can hardly be considered
"private." Any claimed REOP is no longer "reasonable" and the 4th Amendment does not apply. See California
v. Ciraolo, 476 U .S. 207 (1986}; Florida v. Riley, 488 U .S. 445 (1989} . In order for an item to be discovered in
"plain view: (1) the person making the "view" must be lawfully in position to do so (e.g., lawfully on the premises)
and (2} it must be "immediately apparent" in an objective sense that the item is evidence of a crime. See
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S.321 (1987). "Immediately apparent" means that an objective viewer would have
probable cause to know the nature of the item seen, not that it would be "certain." /d.
Administrative searches: The growth of "reasonableness" as the touchstone of the 4th Amendment has brought
a variety of cases in which there is, in a sense, no "sea rch" for crim inal evidence, but rather the fulfillment of
other, important governmental needs that outweigh the interests of the individual in maintaining privacy.
Examples of these include vehicle and personal effects inventory, see South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364
(1976), school searches, see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985}, random urinalysis collection and
testing, see Skinner v, Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), searches of probationers' homes,
see U.S. v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) and roadblocks, see Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.
444 (1990). These "non-searches" are not for the purpose of investigating criminal activity, but are based on
other "special needs. " Regulatory searches for, e.g., alcohol code or fish and game code enforcement may also
fall within this category, based either on no particular suspicion or upon a diminished version of probable cause.
See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U .S. 523 (1967).
Search incident to arrest: While this exception does require probable cause, it is probable cause for the arrest,
and not for the search . A lawful custodial arrest (i.e., one based on probable cause) automatically allows a
contemporaneous search of the •area of immediate control" of the arrestee. See Chime/ v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969); U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). If the arrestee is taken from a vehicle, that area includes
the passenger compartment and any closed compartments within it. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981).

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Probable Cause:
1. The "four corners" rule effectively ensures that the information actually considered by the magistrate in
evaluatin~ probable cause will be available for review by the trial court and, if necessary, by appellate courts.
This rule IS a long-standing requirement in Texas courts, see Jones v. State, 586 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Crim . App.
1978), that limits probable cause review to factual assertions presented by an affiant under oath , a requirement
of both the Texas Constitution and United States Constitution. The review of these facts within the "four
corners" of the affidavit must be done by a "neutral and detached magistrate." See Johnson v. U.S., 333 U.S.
10, 14 {1948) . A magistrate with an interest in the issuance of the warrant other than the required interest in
fai rness and proper determination of the constitutional prerequisites, is not "neutral and detached" and may be
disqualified from issuing the warrant. See, e.g., Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 {1977) (magistrate who
receives a fee for each warrant issued lacks required detachment); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
453 (1971) (wa rrant issued by state attorney general, a member of the executive branch, is not valid).
2. The magistrate must be presented with facts, not conclusions the affiant has drawn from the facts. See Spinelli
v. U.S., 393 U.S . 410, 414 {1969). The point of judicial review, after all, is to allow the magistrate, and not the
police officer, to decide whether probable cause exists. That determination must be based on the evidence
recited within the affidavit. Nothing more than a recitation that the affiant/officer "has cause to suspect and does
believe" that certain items will be found in a particular place, will not support a warrant. See Nathanson v. U.S.,
290 U.S. 41,47 (1933).
3.
Hearsay, usually in the form of information gathered from confidential informants, may establish probable cause,
but only if the assertions are found to be sufficiently reliable. Reliability is established from a "totality of the
circumstances" recited in the affidavit, and not from slavish adherence to the "two-prong" approach of
Aguilar/Spinelli, but those "two-prongs" remain relevant in weighing the information contained in a tip. See
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U .S. 213 (1983) . The "prongs" include the "basis of knowledge" of the informant and the
informant's credibility. Under Gates, a strength in one of these "prongs" can compensate for a weakness in the
other.
Particularity: For searches, the place to be searched must be described with sufficient clarity and particularity that
an executing officer can identify it even if that officer has no prior knowledge of the location. See Steele v. U.S.,
267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925). The particularity requirement is intended to limit the executing officer's discretion, see
Marron v. U.S., 275 U .S. 192, 196 (1927), and is evaluated on the basis of what the affiant knew, rather than
what the search uncovered. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85 {1987).
Court must be authorized to issue warrant: In Texas, the issuance of warrants is strictly limited by statute. An
"evidentiary warrant," for example, ordinarily may be issued only by a properly authonzed magistrate, usually an
attorney-judge of a court of record. See TEX. CR IM. PROC. CODE ANN. Art. 18.01(h). An "evidentiary warrant•
(a warrant for "mere evidence") is authorized by TEX. CRIM . CODE ANN. Art. 18.02(12), and means that the
item{s) sought have only evidentiary value. That is, they are not items of contraband or fruits or instruments of
crime. An example of such evidence might be a hair sample , blood sample, shell casing, article of clothing
{assum ing it's not stolen clothing), etc. Warrants issued by judges without proper authority are invalid.

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Scope: EVERY search is limited to a prescribed "scope." Consequently,
scope is potentially always an issue. The permissible scope of a search
generally is limited by its purpose and underlying rationale. For example,
search incident to arrest may not exceed the "area of immediate control" of the
arrestee, unless the arrestee recently was in a vehicle, in which case the
scope of the search expands to the passenger compartment of the vehicle,
including closed containers. See Chime/ v. California , 395 U.S. 752 (1969);
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981 ). The so-called "elephant in a
matchbox" rule captures this notion by reminding us that officers may not
search in a place where the object of their search cannot be found . See U.S.
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982). If, for example, officers are executing a
warrant to search for stolen stereo equipment, they could not open nightstand
drawers or look in jewelry boxes because the objects they seek (the
equipment) could not fit within small drawers or containers. Additional
information about the scope of each kind of warrantless search may be listed
under the description of that exception elsewhere in these materials.
Return and inventory: State criminal procedure codes usually require
officers who have executed a search warrant to fi le a "return ," which is just a
statement showing how and when the warrant was executed, and whether
anything was seized . Additionally, some states require that an inventory of
seized items be prepared and submitted to the court issuing the warrant, with a
copy of that inventory left on the premises searched or given to the person in
charge of those premises. Texas law has this requirement. See TEX. CRIM .
PROC . CODE ANN. art. 18.06(b).

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Search incident to arrest: The search warrant is excused when a person is arrested because the close
proximity of the arrestee to the police and others poses a danger to the security of those persons, and to any
evidence within the arrestee's control that may be destroyed or altered. See Chime/ v. California, 395 U.S . 752
(1969). These two purposes (finding weapons and preventing the destruction of evidence) outweigh the
arrestee's somewhat diminished privacy rights and justify the warrantless search within a defined scope. For
more on the exception. see slide 8.
C onsent: As noted previously, consent is a voluntary relinquishment of a person's right to insist on a minimal
level of suspicion (probable cause or reasonable suspicion). It also is a relinquishment of judicial oversight in
the warrant process. See Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). Consent may be given by anyone
who has a right of control over the area to be searched, even if that control is shared with others. See U.S. v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974). Police are entitled to rely on what objectively appears to be the authority of a
person to give consent ("apparent authority"). even if it turns out that person lacked actual authority. See Illinois
v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
Exigent circumstances: An "exigency" is a need to act quickly, without the benefit of a warrant. Exigency may
be created by endangerment of life or property, or may be a reasonable belief that evidence will be altered or
destroyed or, for arrest, that a suspect may escape. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Honeycutt v.
State, 499 U.S. 662 (Tex. Grim. App. 1973).
Vehicle exception: The so-called "vehicle exception" is a subset of the exigent circumstances exception. It
excuses a search warrant where probable cause exists to believe that that vehicle contains criminal evidence,
primarily on the grounds that the Inherent mobility of the vehicle presents a risk that the evidence will be lost if
time is taken to seek a warrant. See U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). The scope of such a search may
extend to anyplace in the vehicle that may contain the item for which p.c. exists. /d. at 824. That includes
containers belonging to a passenger who is not necessarily suspected of criminal activity. See Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999). Determining whether a vehicle is a "vehicle," or instead is more like a residence
or other structure can be difficult, especially when it was originally designed for a mobility that it may no longer
possess. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
Frisk: A "frisk" is a patdown of the outer clothing of a suspect solely for the purpose of finding weapons that
may be used to harm the detaining officer or others. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Contrary to popular
belief, a frisk may not be done automatically upon a "stop" or detention. Just as the stop req uires reasonable
suspicion to believe criminal activity is afoot, so the frisk requires a reasonable belief that the suspect is "armed
and dangerous. See id. Its scope IS limited to that purpose and defined geographically by those areas into
which a suspect might easily reach to obtain a weapon. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) ("frisk" of
areas within vehicle where detained driver might reach a weapon).

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Plain view, touch, smell: For an overview, see slide 8. Search warrants are excused in these cases because
(a) the possessor has no reasonable expectation of privacy in what she exposes to the public and (b) the item
that is ' immediately apparent" from the senses has already been "captured" or seized in that it has come within
the awareness of the officer. This is not the same thing as saying that something seen in plain view can always
be seized physically without a warrant. For example, if an officer sees through an open window an item of
contraband in a house, and the officer was lawfully in a position to make that "view," the officer may not forcibly
enter to seize the contraband without a warrant unless some exigency or other warrant exception applies. See
Horton v. California, 469 U.S. 128 (1990).
Inventory: Following the lawful impoundment of a vehicle and pursuant to established departmental guidelines,
the contents of that vehicle may be "inventoried." See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). T his is
not a "search" for criminal evidence; in fact, if it is conducted with an investigative motive, it is subject to the
same probable cause and warrant requirements as ordinary searches. Rather, it is a taking stock of personal
effects in the vehicle to achieve three governmental interests: protection of the owner's property, protecting the
police from false claims of theft or loss, and preserving the safety of the officer and others. See id. In order for a
vehicle inventory to be valid, there must be a legitimate reason for impounding the vehicle. Reasonable
alternatives to impoundment or a lack of standardized policies for impoundment and inventory will undermine a
claim of inventory, as will an investigative motive. See Benavides v. State, 600 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Crim. App .
1980). The permissible scope of a vehicle inventory is subject to some dispute, both in 4th Amendment law and
as applied in Texas. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); Stephen v. State, 677 S.W.2d 42 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1984); Autran v. State, 887 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Inventory of the personal effects of
persons arrested prior to incarceration also is allowed for the same reasons. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S.
640 (1983).
Border search: As noted previously in slide 8, searches at an international border or its functional equivalent
are justified primarily by maintenance of the sovereignty of the United States, and are not subject to the same
safeg uards as ordinary law enforcement searches. See U.S. v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
Re!)ulatoryladministrative search: This broad category includes inspections of regulated commercial
activities, f1sh and game inspections, and other "non-searches' based on "special needs" of government other
than the ordinary need for law enforcement. This very important and wowing area of search law is based on the
balancing of interests initiated in Terry v. Ohio and applied directly to' special needs" in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325 (1985). "Special needs" searches include school searches, roadblocks/checkpoints, searches of
probationer's homes, regulated businesses, random urinalysis testing, and searches of governmental offices.
None of these requires a search warrant or probable cause, and some do not require even individualized
suspicion. For a survey of this growth in "special needs" searches and descriptions of these cases, see Gerald
S. Reamey, "When 'Special Needs' Meet Probable Cause: Denying the Devil Benefit of Law, 19 HASTINGS
CONST. L. Q. 295 (1992)

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Entry into suspect's residence to execute warrant: A valid felony arrest
warrant carries the implied authority to enter the residence of the suspect if
there is reason to believe the suspect is within. See Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 603 (1980); Dusek v. State, 467 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Crim . App. 1971 ).
Officers may not enter a residence without consent or exigent circumstances,
however, in order to make an arrest without a warrant. !d.; see TEX. CRIM.
PROC. CODE AN N. art. 14.05. "Hot pursuit" may justify entry into the
residence to effect a warrantless arrest. See U.S. v. Santana , 427 U.S. 38
(1976).
Entry into third party's residence to execute warrant: The judicial review
process for an arrest warrant provides some measure of protection for the
privacy rights of the person to be arrested. It does not provide, however, such
protection for the privacy rights of a third party in whose residence the wanted
person may be found . Unless officers seeking to execute an arrest warrant
obtain consent to enter from that third party, or unless some exigency exists
that prevents the officers from obtaining a search warrant for the premises,
they may not enter to make the arrest. See Steagald v. U.S., 451 U.S. 204
(1981 ). Texas law authorizes a magistrate to issue a search warrant for the
premises in the event that neither of these exceptions applies. See TEX.
CRIM . PROC. CODE ANN . art. 18.02(11 ).

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In U.S. v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), the Court adopted a "public place"
exception to the arrest warrant requirement. If probable cause exists to
believe a person has committed a crime, that person may be arrested without
warrant if he or she is found in public.

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Unlike the 4th Amendment standard, Texas law permits warrantless arrest only in certain statutorily
defined circumstances. See Dejarnette v. State, 732 S.W.2d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
Fortunately, these are accumulated in a relatively few code provisions. Unfortunately, the interpretation
of each is challenging .
Art. 14.01: This provision is one of the "citizen's arrest" authorizations in Texas law. Any person may
arrest without warrant a person who commits a felony offense, or an "offense against the public peace,"
within his presence or view. See Ramo v. State, 577 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). It is unclear
what offenses are those "against the public peace," and Texas courts decide this question in an ad hoc
manner. See, e.g., Ramo, supra. Logic in this interpretation is a very uncertain gu1de. Peace officers are
permitted to make warrantless arrests for any offense, felony or misdemeanor, that is committed in their
presence or view. Note that this authority does not mean the officer can act in his/her official capacity
outside the officer's territorial jurisdiction. For some help deciding the jurisdictional question, see article
14.03.
Art. 14.03: Although it began only as a peculiar authorization to arrest persons found in "suspicious
places" where probable cause exists to believe they are guilty of having committed a felony, breach of
the peace, or a few other offenses, or threaten or are about to commit such an offense, the statute has
become a dumping ground for disparate exceptions. For a recent attempt to make sense of this
provision, see Dyar v. State, 125 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); GeraldS. Reamey, Arrests in
Texas's "Suspicious Places": A Rule in Search of Reason, TEX. TECH . L. REV. 931 (2000). Another
warrant exception within art. 14.03 is for domestic violence cases and violation of protective orders. See
art. 14.03(a)(2), (3), (4), (b). Yet a different subsection allows arrest of persons who have lawfully
confessed commission of a felony to the arresting officer if that confession would establish probable
cause. See art. 14.03(a)(6). The statute also allows arrest of person believed to have prevented or
interfered with a person's ability to place an emergency telephone call, see art. 14.03(a)(5), and defines
some of the limitations on a peace officer's arrest jurisdiction. See art. 14.03(d), (g)(1 ), (g)(2).
Art. 14.04: A peace officer who has probable cause on the basis of a credible representation that a felon
is about to escape so that there is no time to obtain a warrant, may arrest without warrant under this
provision. In Fry v. State, 639 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982), the Court explained that this statute
does not require that no time for a warrant actually exists, and that the offender does not actually have to
be about to flee , but only that the credible representation leads the officer reasonably to believe those
things are true.
Art. 18.16: This is the other citizen's arrest authorization. The statute allows anyone (securitf guards,
store employees , interested citizens, etc.) to arrest without a warrant any person suspected o committing
a theft-related offense. See Rhodes v. State, 712 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. App.- San Antonio 1986, no pet.).

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Files

Collection

Citation

Gerald S. Reamey, “CLE: 2009: Fourth Amendment Analysis: Understanding the Probable Cause and Warrant Requirements of the Fourth Amendment,” St. Mary's Law Digital Repository, accessed October 21, 2017, http://lawspace.stmarytx.edu/item/STMU_HomecomingCLE2009Reamey.

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